

FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

NSA & DIA Declassification/Release Instructions on File

KIQ 18: *What is the status of Soviet RDT&E, and what progress is being made toward deployment of, and reporting improvements in, a satellite-borne ocean surveillance system?*

I. COMMUNITY COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY

- A. The question^{s/t} with regard to this KIQ are both technical and force-related. During the next year we should make an assessment of the military capability represented by the current Soviet efforts in this field and improvements likely over the near term. Our assessment should include judgements on:

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& NSA

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II. AGENCIES WORKING ON THIS KIQ

25X1X1& NSA

- A. Collection. [REDACTED] will continue to collect information about

25X1D0a
& NSA 25X3

[REDACTED]

25X1A2c
& NSA 25X3

[REDACTED]

25X1C

[REDACTED]

- B. Production. FTD through DIA will produce a yearly report on all satellite systems. Guided Missile and Astronautics Intelligence Committee (GMAIC) will hold seminars as appropriate during the year to aid in the assessment of characteristics of the satellite systems and to develop a plan for collectors. [REDACTED] will all produce memoranda on various aspects of the systems as evidence becomes available and analysis is completed. A combined interagency paper under the aegis of the NIO will be produced late in FY 75. DIA, CIA, US Navy and other interested intelligence organizations will participate. - 2 -


25X1X1
& NSA

25X3

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25X1X1



B. Production. Close attention will be given by all

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to the early dissemination of that information
to the analytic organizations of the Community.

25X1D6b



reports will continue to be issued by the principal
agencies as the analysis is completed. When use-
ful in special cases, joint interagency intelligence
memoranda done under the aegis of the NIO/CF will
be produced. GMAIC will reexamine their collection
priorities with respect to Soviet naval cruise
missile systems.

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October 31, 1974

FY 75 KIQ STRATEGY REPORT

KIQ 26: *What are the strengths and weaknesses of Warsaw Pact forces for theatre war?*

I. COMMUNITY COLLECTION AND PRODUCTION STRATEGY

- A. The effort with regard to this KIQ will be concentrated on providing a good estimate of the combat effectiveness of Warsaw Pact ground forces and tactical aviation in Eastern Europe, and also on non-Soviet national air defense forces there -- and on Pact perceptions of NATO strengths and weaknesses.

II. AGENCIES WORKING ON THIS KIQ

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A.

25X1D1a

subject.

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
& NSA 25X3

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- B. Production. The primary community output will be in the US MC-161 position paper/NIE 11-14 effort. DIA, CIA and [REDACTED] will be the principal participants under the aegis of the NIO. NOTE: Readiness, mobilization and reinforcement are considered in KIQ 27; logistics in KIQ 28.

III. COMMENTS OF THE NIO/CF

- A. The greatest evident deficiency at the outset of work on this KIQ is the insufficient number of analysts assigned at CIA and DIA to work in this area in the short term because of the demands for MBFR support. Although generally speaking adequate amounts of information are collected there are some areas where additional effort is needed. More useful data can probably be provided by:



- B. It does not seem profitable to reduce the present level of analytic effort devoted to MBFR, but if the Intelligence Community is to provide the support required by Secretary Schlesinger in his attempts to optimize NATO conventional

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force structure, more analytic effort will be required for this and KIQs 27 and 28.

- C. In addition to more analysts, there is a need for improved analytic methodologies to support assessments of Warsaw Pact strengths and weaknesses in relation to current NATO and future posture.

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